In a recent article, Chen [2012] presents a liquidity discount model in which financial securities can be evaluated with substantial discounts at the presence of the liquidity squeeze in the marketplace. Combining the Geske [1977] and Chen [2012] models, this article provides empirical analysis of financial institutions' asset values. By adopting both models and using market information to calibrate the model, this study can evaluate the liquidity impact on the banks during the crisis period. We find that the model can provide significant explanatory power of a bank's liquidity health.
In this article, we use the Geske [1977] model to describe the capital structure of a firm. The economic and liquidity defaults defined earlier are formalized under the Geske model. We then combine the liquidity model by Chen [2012] with the Geske model to study a financial institution's asset value. As a result, regulators can use the model developed in this article to monitor the liquidity condition for the entire banking industry once all the banks in the industry are included. Furthermore, each bank can also adopt this model to understand its own liquidity risk and adopt necessary steps to enhance its liquidity (in compliance with the Basel regulation) before it is too late.
In the next section, we describe the combined model used for banks' assets. We then follow with empirical work that studies 23 U.S. banks.
A MODEL FOR BANKS' ASSETS UNDER A LIQUIDITY SQUEEZE The Model of Liquidity
This subsection provides a brief overview of the Chen [2012] model. To evaluate the discount (or premium) caused by illiquidity, one needs a convex (or concave) relationship between the asset value ( A ) of the firm and the fundamental economy (proxied by wealth, W ). The liquid asset value is computed by the binomial model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (CRR): At a given future date (T ), the asset value is convex in wealth. In this article, we specify a call payoff to capture such convexity.
2 That is, we specify that
, where K , the strike price of the call, represents the convexity of the payoff. In Chen, the underlying wealth variable, T W , is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution with mean W µ and variance
Chen argues that the larger the convexity, the larger the discount. As a result, the "liquidity health" of the assets ( A ) is determined by K . When 0 K = , illiquidity has no impact on the asset value A . Later on, we calibrate this parameter to the firm's spreads.
According to Chen, when no trading is permitted for the asset, 3 the illiquid price is computed by the following equation:
(1)
is the risk-free money market account and
is known as the dollar beta. This solution must be computed numerically. Exhibit 1 is generated using the following parameters: where the liquid price (plotted vertically) is computed using the CRR binomial model and the illiquid price is computed using Equation (1) (plotted horizontally).
[Exhibit 1 Here]
In Exhibit 1, the horizontal axis represents the illiquid value of the asset (symbolized by * A ), and the vertical represents the liquid value (symbolized by A ). The 45-degree line represents perfect liquidity, in which there is no difference between the liquid and the illiquid values. The solid curve, dotted curve, and the dash-dotted curve represent different magnitudes of the convexity parameter, K . As Exhibit 1 illustrates, the greater the convexity, the greater the discount.
Economic Default and Liquidity Default
Let the asset (only one class to begin with) of a financial company follow the Black-Scholes model:
where z is Brownian motion and A µ and A σ are drift and diffusion, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that the firm has two debts (to be extended to multiple-coupon debts) 4 , both zero coupon, with face values 1 K and 2 K and maturities 1 T and 2 T , respectively.
When the economy is "normal" and the market is perfectly liquid, 5 it must be the case that defaults can occur only as the result of economic reasons. In the Merton [1974] and Geske [1977] 
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When the economy is under liquidity stress, the asset value is compressed. For this scenario, we represent the liquidity-compressed price as As a result, the liquidity default is defined (going concern) as 1 
But under a specific seniority order, as Geske and Johnson [1984] assume. 5 The day-to-day usual and minor liquidity discounts are assumed away here. where ( ) 
Modeling Assets
With the liquidity discount model and the capital structure model established, it is possible to now value a bank's assets. We continue to use the parameters with a choice of 80 K = in the previous subsection for the Chen model to compute the illiquid asset value * t A . For the capital structure model, we assume the following:
Note that for every given t A , we use the economic default model-Equation (3) 6 Given that this is only a one-period calculation, the Geske model is identical to the Merton model. 7 Note that in the empirical work, the illiquid asset value is assumed to follow the same lognormal distribution as the liquid asset value. 8 One needs to infer the wealth value W from the CRR binomial model and then compute the illiquid asset value using Equation (1).
Exhibit 2 plots
* t E and t E against the liquid asset value, t A . 9 In Exhibit 2, for each liquid asset value, we use Exhibit 1 to map out the illiquid asset value. 10 Then we use the binomial model to compute the liquid equity value (solid line) and illiquid equity value (dotted line). In the gray area, the market is liquid and the "economic equity value"
is lower (as argued before, 1
). In the yellow area, the market is under a liquidity squeeze, and hence the "liquidity equity value" is lower. Using the liquidity discount model in Chen, we find that the two curves cross, as shown in the figure.
[Exhibit 2 Here]
We argue that equity investors will price the equity using the economic default model when there is no liquidity concern and using the liquidity default model whenever there is liquidity concern. As a result, the equity value is the smaller of the two economic/liquidity values. The crossover point in Exhibit 2 separates economic default from liquidity default. The left side of the crossover point represents situations in which liquidity defaults dominate, and the right side of the crossover point represents situations in which economic defaults dominate.
Typically, it is unknown whether an equity value observed in the marketplace reflects the liquidity value or the economic value of the assets. The model portrayed in Exhibit 2 allows for this distinction. If a firm is dominated by the risk of a liquidity default, then the model will suggest a higher asset value when using Equation (3) than when using Equation (3*). Similarly, if a firm suffers no liquidity problems (i.e., dominated by the risk of an economic default), the model will suggest a higher asset value when using Equation (3*) than when using Equation (3). This distinction facilitates the empirical study of banks' liquidity health.
In the next subsection, we use the market equity value (market capitalization) to infer the asset value assuming perfect liquidity (i.e., using Equation (3)). In other words, we assume the market equity value as the economic value (red line in Exhibit 2) and compute the liquid asset value t A (horizontal axis in Exhibit 2). Then we use the Chen model to compute the illiquid asset value, * t A , and the illiquid equity value, * t E . The convexity parameter in the Chen model, K , is solved by calibrating the model to the 9 A similar graph can be plotted against the illiquid asset value, . 10 To do this, note that each liquid price of the asset is mapped to a wealth level, and then Equation (1) is used to calculate the illiquid asset value. firm's credit spreads. The results, discussed in the next subsection, show that during a crisis period, the illiquid values deviate substantially.
Discussions
To take advantage of the closed-form solution of the Geske model for the capital structure of a firm, the firm's asset value must follow a lognormal distribution. Chen's liquidity discount model, however, will not necessarily generate a lognormal distribution for the asset value. In fact, the functional form of the Chen model used in this article is the same as the one used in the original study, where the underlying state variable (wealth) follows a lognormal distribution and hence the resulting asset value is not a lognormal distribution.
Consequently, the empirical results we obtain in this article are only approximations. We argue that these approximations do not change our conclusion qualitatively, however, in that 1) calibration cancels many of the approximation errors and 2) we measure the liquidity impact only in a relative manner, and hence absolute magnitudes are not used.
We note that both distributions for the asset value (lognormal in the Geske model and a resulting non-lognormal in the Chen model) are right skewed, and discrepancies are less when the skewness level is lower.
EMPIRICAL WORK
We apply the model to examine the 23 largest banks in the United States to investigate how their assets are affected if the market faces a liquidity squeeze. We use market information-that is, market capitalization and its volatility-to infer the implied liquid and illiquid asset values. These values differ from the book value of assets in that they reflect the evaluations of equity investors. In other words, we assume that equity investors correctly evaluate the firm's assets and credit risk (via its capital structure) and assign a value to the equity. When the market is free from a liquidity squeeze, then the equity value should reflect the perfectly liquid asset value. Similarly, when the market is under a liquidity squeeze, the asset value is compressed and the equity value is also lowered to reflect the liquidity-discounted asset value.
As a result, we adopt the following steps to calibrate the model to the market information:
• We compute, monthly, 
Data
The data we use in this study contain Lehman Brothers and a set of the 23 largest banks in the United States during the period from January 2004 to December 2009. This period covers the peak of the real estate bubble and the financial crisis trigged by the Lehman default. The debt data, obtained from FactSet, include all the liabilities issued by the banks. Using the coupon, maturity, and other specific information (e.g., floating/fixed, call/put provision, amortization, and other miscellaneous items), we estimate the cash flows and bucket them into monthly amounts (month-end). In the empirical work, however, we further group these numerous cash flows into two cash flows 1 K and 2 K . In the empirical work, we sum up all the first-year cash flows as 1 K . To calculate 2 K , we sum up all the second-year cash flows and then add half of all the remaining cash flows.
The equity data are obtained monthly (month-end) from Yahoo.com and used to compute the equity volatility and market capitalization. The outstanding shares are obtained from the annual reports (to compute market capitalization). The risk-free rate used in the corporate finance model (Equations (3) and (3 * )) is the three-month Treasury rate taken from Bloomberg. 11 We follow the KMV method, in which all cash flows after 2 T are aggregated and halved and then added to the 2 T cash-flow. 12 The asset values computed with this method are the liquidity values.
Lehman Case Study
We use Lehman Brothers Inc. as an example to describe in detail how we calibrate the model to estimate the liquidity discount of Lehman's asset value. We report the liquidity-discounted asset values during the sample period and demonstrate the inevitability of Lehman's default. At the time of its failure, Lehman was highly leveraged and used a large amount of short-term repurchase transactions (also called repos). The high leverage and reliance on short-term financing was rumored to have led to difficulties in Lehman being able to renew the contracts, and banks refused to lend to Lehman. Lehman's fall marks the beginning of the credit crisis and the worst economic recession since World War II.
Whether Lehman's default, and indeed the entire crisis, was a liquidity crisis or a credit crisis is an ongoing debate. Lehman reported earnings of $489 million for the first quarter of 2008 and was able to raise $4 billion of equity capital in April. But this turned out to be too little and too late. Our results indicate that Lehman's liquidity started to deteriorate in mid 2007 as Bear Stearns revealed its troubles in the two hedge funds and has not recovered since. Exhibit 3 shows a time line of events at Lehman.
[Exhibit 3 Here]
Exhibit 4 displays the debt maturity structure from December 2007 to September 2008. The graph shows the notional debt value maturing in each year. As the exhibit illustrates, short-term debt maturing in one to three years dominated in Lehman's liability structure. Such a liability structure is typical for financial institutions that finance their operations using liquid, short-term debt. Exhibit 4 also shows a spike for debt maturing after 30 years, which includes perpetual debt, preferred securities, and 30-to 40-year mortgage-backed securities. It is very important to note that that Lehman's short-term debt increased dramatically after March 2008. This increase reflects the constraints imposed on Lehman after the fall of Bear Stearns. We are able to show, however, that these short-term debts put even more pressure on Lehman as the financial crisis worsened.
[Exhibit 4 Here]
To estimate Lehman's asset values, we first simplify the debt structure to have only two annual payments to fit to Equation (3). The first payment, 1 K , equals the first cash flow due in one year (seen in Exhibit 4). The second payment, 2 K , equals the second cash flow plus half of all the remaining cash flows.
13
The market capitalization is used as the equity value in the Geske modelEquation (3). The volatility, A σ , is estimated using daily one-year historical continuously compounded stock returns. The volatility of stock returns is an equity volatility, E σ , and needs to be translated to the asset volatility, A σ , with the transformation formula
, defined in Equation (3). Now we can proceed to estimate the asset value (liquid) of Lehman using the market capitalization value as the equity value. This approach (of using market cap and the volatility of market cap) to solve for the asset value and asset volatility is adopted widely in industry and academic research.
After solving for the asset value and asset volatility, we compute the liquidityconstraint asset value using the Chen model. Several parameters in this model are preset: the frequency of rebalancing (symbolized by k in the original article) is set to 0; the mean and standard deviation of the underlying state variable W µ and W σ are set to 0.6 and 0.3, respectively; the risk-free rate r is set to 0; and finally, the number of steps for the binomial model is set to four, to conserve time.
14 The number of steps used in implementing Equation (3 * ) is 100. Now we are left with only one parameter, K , which represents the convexity of the liquidity discount function. To minimize the calibration, we use the "implied credit spreads" from the Geske model (see the Appendix for the spread calculation). Because liquidity and credit risks are highly correlated (see, e.g., a recent study by Imbierowicz and Rauch [2012] ), this calibration is reasonable. 15 Because liquidity worsens when the spread widens, we set the parameter to
where W is wealth and s is the implied spread. The two scalars, 4 and 10%, are designed to bring the level of the 13 This method is proposed by KMV. 14 None of these parameter values has any material impact on the final result as we calibrate the model to the market information. Currently we use only information from equities. Should more information be available for calibration, many of these parameters can be estimated more meaningfully. 15 We could calibrate the parameter to the CDS spreads and achieve similar results because of the extremely high correlation between the implied credit spreads and the CDS spreads. The result is available on request. spread in line with the level of the convexity parameter. These two scalars only parallelshift the illiquid values from the liquid values and do not change the relative relationship between them. One alternative method to estimate these two scalars is to use crosssectional data, which is beyond the scope of this article.
Note that
by construction, as demonstrated clearly in Exhibit 1. As a result, during a "normal" time, the equality holds, and during an "illiquid" time, the inequality holds. Exhibit 5 plots the liquid asset value ( t A ) and the illiquid asset value ( The findings can be broken into three different groups. The first group consists of liquidity-healthy banks: BBT, STT, BK, TRV, BRK.A, and PNC. 16 The second group consists of banks that were healthy until the crisis occurred (month 58): PRU, USB, STI, COF, FITB, ALL, PFG, and AIG. This group of banks was deeply affected (spillover) by the Lehman bankruptcy. The third group of banks demonstrated early signs of liquidity weakness: WAMUQ, C, BAC (not so early), SLM, GS, FRE, FNM, GNW, and AXP.
These banks were similar to Lehman in their liquidity vulnerability. 16 The appendix lists the banks' full names.
Out of the 23 banks in the sample, FNM (Fannie Mae) and FRE (Freddie Mac) are the two poorest performers. Throughout the sample period, they never demonstrated enough liquidity, even during the peak of the bubble. This result is striking in the sense that they were more highly rated by rating agencies than all the other banks in the sample, likely because of implicit guarantees by the government.
Another point deserving special mention is that GS (Goldman Sachs) was the only bank (except for FNM and FRE) that demonstrated liquidity weakness at the time (month 42, or July, 2007) when Bear Stearns' two troubled hedge funds unfolded. Because GS is the largest investment bank, its liquidity weakness at the beginning of the crisis signals that the whole investment banking industry may be vulnerable to liquidity risk.
CONCLUSION AND EXTENSION
In this article, we combine Chen's [2012] liquidity discount model and Geske's [1977] corporate finance model to estimate the asset value of the 23 largest U.S. banks.
We discover that in almost no circumstance between 2004 and 2009 were these banks dominated by economic default. Rather, they were affected by liquidity default.
Furthermore, in hindsight (in-sample test), our model is quite predictive in the liquidity discounted value of the assets. As a result, the model we propose in this article is a reasonable tool for banks and regulators to use in monitoring the liquidity health of either individual financial institutions or the entire economy.
A natural extension of our model can be used to study liquidity discounted value for various asset classes. In this article, we calculate only one asset value-the aggregated value of all of a firm's assets. To provide better risk management, it is conceivable to provide valuation for each of the distinctive asset classes (e.g., Treasuries versus mortgage-backed securities). . The illiquid price is computed by Equation (1). 
Exhibit 2. Equity Values under Liquidity and Economic Defaults

